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1   Introduction  
The presence of disparities between States on the one hand and ecological and economic 
interdependence on the other has given rise to a number of challenges in international 
cooperative efforts. In the realm of international environmental cooperation, the 
challenge is one of integrating diverse States into environmental treaty regimes.1 For now 
over three decades of environmental dialogue, countries have created a conceptual legal 
framework, arrived at a range of different burden-sharing arrangements, and deployed 
various principles to integrate different States into international environmental regimes.2  
The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (hereinafter referred to as 
CBDR) is one of the most effective principles in the international environmental law 
legal regime. 
 
The principle of common but differentiated responsibility primarily entails two elements: 
common responsibility and differentiated responsibilities. These two elements are 
explained below. 
 
Common responsibility describes the shared obligations of two or more States towards 
the protection of a particular environmental resource. Common responsibility is likely to 
apply where the resource is shared, under the control of no state, or under the sovereign 
control of a state, but subject to a common legal interest.3  The concept of common 
responsibility evolved from an extensive series of international laws governing resources 
labelled as ‘common heritage of mankind’ or of ‘common concern.’4 
 
The CBDR principle has been applied in several treaties, The 1952 Tuna Convention, 
inter alia categorizes tuna and fish as being of “common interest of mankind and the 
                                                           
1 L. Rajamani ,‘The Nature, Promise, and Limits of Differential Treatment in the Climate Regime, in Ole Kristian 
Fauchald & Jacob Werksman (Eds.), Year Book of International Environmental Law, Oxford University Press. vol. 
16, p. 82(2005) .   
2 Id. 
3 Philippe Sands,  Principles  of International Environmental  Law  (2nd   ed , Cambridge  Univ. Press 2003) . 
4 Id. at 217. 
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conservation of these species is aimed at serving common interest of mankind.5 Under the 
Outer Space Treaty, the outer space and the moon are referred to as the “province of all 
mankind”6. The preamble to the Ramsar Convention categorises waterfowls as an 
“international resource”7. The World Heritage Convention refers to the “World Heritage 
of mankind as a whole,” and imposes a duty on the international community to protect it.8 
 
 Although state practice is inconclusive as to the precise legal nature of each formulation, 
certain legal responsibilities are attributable to all States with respect to these 
environmental media and natural resources under treaty or customary law.9 While the 
extent and legal nature of that responsibility will differ for each resource and instrument, 
the responsibility of each state to prevent harm, in particular through the adoption of 
environmental standards and international environmental obligations, can also differ.10 
 
A distinction should be drawn between the concepts of “common interest”, “common 
concern”, “common heritage of mankind” and common responsibility under CBDR.   
While  the  former   refer  to collective  responsibility  to which state sovereignty  must 
give way to some extent and were originally  developed to deal with global common 
issues , such as the use of deep seabed resources and the utilization of the outer space, 
common responsibility under the CBDR on the other hand goes a step further to include 
perspectives  on states’ historical  contributions  to global environmental  degradation  
and incorporates fairness and justice elements  to be taken into account  when devising 
relevant legal commitments.11  It follows from the above that common responsibility 
under CBDR is based on the principle of solidarity of fair sharing of both the effort to 
                                                           
5 International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the orth Pacific Ocean, 9 May 1952, United States-
Canada-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786.   
6 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 Jan. 1967 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force 10 Oct. 1967), 
Article 1.   
7 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 2 Feb. 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 
11,084, 996 U.N.T.S. 245, Art. 2(3), Preamble. 
8 Convention Concerning Protection of World Cultural Property and atural Heritage, 23 Nov. 1972 U.S.T. 40. 
Article 6.  
9 Sands , supra  note 3, at 218. 
10 Id.  at 218-219. 
11 Id.   
5 
 
protect a resource and of the enjoyment of the accruing benefits.12 Common 
responsibility under CBDR was a response to the voices mainly coming from the 
developing world demanding fairer rules to international environmental cooperation.13  
 
The second element is differentiated responsibility which entails the need to take into 
account the different circumstances, particularly each State’s contribution to the 
evolution of a particular problem and its ability to prevent, reduce and control the 
threat.14 Differentiated responsibility of States for the protection of the environment is 
widely accepted in treaty and other State practices. It translates into differentiated 
environmental standards set on the basis of a range of factors, including special needs and 
circumstances, future economic development of countries, and historic contributions to 
the creation of an environmental problem.15   
 
Differentiated responsibility therefore aims to promote substantive equality between 
developing and developed States within a regime, rather than mere formal equality.16 The 
rationale is to ensure that developing countries can come into compliance with particular 
legal rules over time – thereby strengthening the regime in the long term.17 The next 
paragraphs illustrate the application of Differentiated responsibilities in treaties, soft law 
and international case law among others.  
 
 Differentiated responsibility has been enacted in a number of treaties and it is usually 
mentioned alongside common responsibility. One of the aims of the 1982, UNCLOS is to 
inter alia   create “a just and equitable international economic order which takes into 
account the interests and needs of developing countries.18 The international Undertaking 
                                                           
12 Id.    
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 219. 
15 Id. see also , Tuula Honkonen, the Common  But Differentiated Responsibility Principle in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements : Regulatory and Policy Aspects.  (Kluwer Law International , Netherlands 2009). 
16 Sands, supra note 3 at 218. 
17
Id.  
 
18 United ations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122 21 ILM 1245 
(entered into force 16 November 1994). 
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on Plant Genetic Resources of 1983 after declaring plant genetic resources to be a 
“heritage of mankind,” calls upon parties to cooperate in establishing or strengthening the 
capabilities of developing countries with respect to plant genetic resource activities.19 
 
The preamble to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
requires “special provision to meet the needs of developing countries, including the 
provision of additional financial resources and access to relevant technologies. In 
addressing the special needs of developing countries, the protocol grants them a ten-year 
grace period for compliance and it stresses that their achievement of the goals set by the 
protocol is dependent on financial cooperation and technology transfer from developed 
countries.20 
 
The United ations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 which is the 
main focus of this study is dominated by provisions on CBDR. It begins by referring to 
climate change as “a common concern of humankind.21  The preamble in no uncertain 
terms calls for cooperation by all countries in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities. The commitments under the Convention are subject to 
CBDR.22  Economies in transition are also subjected to differential treatment.23 The 1997 
Kyoto Protocol which is the implementing Protocol to the FCCC also reiterates CBDR. 
Accordingly, developed countries take up certain commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, economies in transition have lesser commitments and developing nations 
make no commitments at all under the Protocol.24 
 
                                                           
19 Food and Agriculture Organization, International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (1983), art. 1. 6. 
20 Montreal Protocol on Substances the Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 26 I.LM 154 (entered into 
force 1 January 1989), as amended by the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, UNEP/OZ.L.Pro.2.3, art 5(1) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. Arts. 5, 10, 10A. 
21 United ations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849, Preamble. Art. 3(1), 
3(2).(Hereinafter UNFCCC). 
22 Id. art. 4(1), 4(2). 
23 Id. Art. 4(6). 
24 Kyoto Protocol to the United ations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 10 December 1997, 37 I.L.M. 
22 (1998), arts. 3(1) and (5) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
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 Under the United ations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), 
desertification and drought are recognized as having a global effect. In addressing these 
problems, the Convention calls for “full consideration of the special needs and 
circumstances of affected developing countries particularly the least among them.25  
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity in its preamble notes that “conservation of 
biological diversity is a common concern of humankind.” On the basis of CBDR, it calls 
for special provision to meet the needs of developing countries.26 It mandates all parties 
to cooperate in the provision of financial and other support to developing countries for in- 
and ex-situ conservation.27 Differentiation is articulated in clearer terms under Article 20 
thus: developed countries must provide financial resources to developing countries to 
enable the latter to implement the Convention. It further provides in Article 20(4) that 
developing countries’ ability to meet their obligations depends on developed countries 
implementing their own commitments on financial resources and technology transfer.  
 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, while 
recognizing that “plant genetic resources for food and agriculture are a common concern 
of all countries,”28enacts differentiation by imposing certain responsibilities on developed 
countries for the benefit of developing countries and economies in transition.  Hence, 
international cooperation is to be directed to establishing or strengthening the capabilities 
of developing countries and economies in transition.29 In addition, parties are required to 
promote the provision of technical assistance to developing countries and economies in 
transition.30 
 
                                                           
25 Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, 
particularly in Africa, 17 June 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1328 [hereinafter Desertification Convention]. Art. 3, 5, 6. 
26 United ations Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 31 I.L.M. 822. 
27 Id. arts. 8(m) and 9(e). 
28 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, November 2001 (entered into force 29 
June 2004). 
29 Id. art. 7.2(a). 
30 Id. art.8. 
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The  Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants  (POPs),31 in its preamble makes 
mention of the  respective  capabilities  of developed  ad developing  countries and the 
common but differentiated responsibilities  of State and makes provision for exceptions 
from some obligations  and requires that the  conference  of the Parties  takes due account 
of  the special circumstances of the developing country Parties and Parties with 
economies in transition” in deciding whether to grant the exceptions.32 Under Article 
12(12), parties are required to provide timely and appropriate technical assistance” to 
developing and transitioning countries to assist them to meet their obligations under the 
Convention and under Article 13(2) there are similar requirements for financial 
assistance.  The 1996 Protocol to the London Convention obliges developed countries to 
transfer technology for the benefit of “developing countries and countries in transition to 
market economies, on favourable terms.”33  
 
CBDR, is also enshrined   under the WTO, agreements, here the principle manifests itself 
in terms of what is referred to as “special and differential treatment” provisions. These 
provisions grant developing countries longer time periods to implement commitments as 
well as provisions that allow developed countries to treat developing countries more 
favourably to increase their trading opportunities.34  There are also provisions which 
require technical assistance and technology transfer from developed to developing 
countries.  Under the GATT for example, there is enshrined in the “Enabling Clause” a 
system of preferences under which “parties may accord differential and more favourable 
treatment to developing countries, without according that treatment to other contracting 
                                                           
31 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 22 May 2001 (entered into force 17 May 2004). 8  
 
32 Id. art. 4(7). 
33 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 
Nov. 13, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, 11 I.L.M. 1294 (1972), art. 13(1.5). 
 
 
34  Jarrod Hepburn and Imran Ahmad.,  The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. A Legal 
Working Paper in the CISDL “Recent Developments in International Law Related to Sustainable Development” 
Series. Available at: http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/sdl/SDL_Common_but_Diff.pdf (accessed on 18 November 2010). 
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parties.”35 When granting concessions, developed countries should not demand that 
developing countries reciprocate.36  
 
CBDR under the TRIPS inter alia takes the form of granting extra implementation   time 
to developing countries37 and indefinitely delaying implementation for the least 
developed countries.38 Developed countries are obliged under the TRIPS to provide 
incentives to “enterprises and institutions in their territories” for technology transfer to 
developing countries “in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological 
base.39 Developing countries are at liberty under the SPS  Agreement  to request time-
limited exemptions  from their  obligations , on the other hand , developed countries are 
required to consider providing  technical assistance to exporting  developing countries  to 
allow them  to meet any SPS standards  set by the importing  developed country.40  
Therefore, CBDR has been accorded a place in the international economic system. 
 
Differentiated responsibility has also been expressed in soft law. Under the  
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI),   CBDR was stated in no uncertain terms 
thus: The implementation of Agenda 21 and the achievement of the internationally agreed 
development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration as well as in 
the present plan of action, require a substantially increased effort, both by countries 
themselves and by the rest of the international community, based on the recognition that 
each country has primary responsibility for its own development and that the role of 
national policies and development strategies cannot be overemphasized, taking fully into 
                                                           
35 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries, GATT Doc. L/4903, 28 November 1979, B.I.S.D. 203, para. 1.  
 
36 World Trade Organization, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, art. XXXVI(8). 
37 World Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement), art. 65:2. 
38 Id.  art. 66:1. 
39
Id. Art.  66:2 
40 World Trade Organization, Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), arts. 9.2 and 
10.3. 9. 
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account the Rio principles, including, in particular, the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities.41 
 
The implication of the above provision is that CBDR is one of the guiding principles for 
the implementation of Agenda 21. 
 
The 1995, Copenhagen Declaration also enunciates  CBDR, it  provides that “the 
formulation and implementation of  strategies, policies, programmes and actions for 
social development are the responsibility of each country and should take into account 
the economic, social and environmental diversity of conditions in each country.”42 Under 
Commitment 5 parties are required to cooperate to assist developing countries at their 
request, in their efforts to achieve equality and equity and the empowerment of women. 
Commitment 7 calls for support for the “the domestic efforts of Africa and the least 
developed countries to implement economic reforms, programmes to increase food 
security, and commodity diversification.” 
 
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration in its principle 23, provides that :Without prejudice to 
such criteria as may be agreed upon by the international community, or to standards 
which will have to be determined nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider 
the systems of values prevailing in each country, and the extent of the applicability of 
standards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be 
inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries.
43
 
 
The 1992 Rio Declaration provides that the special situation and needs of developing 
countries, particularly the least developed and those most environmentally vulnerable, 
                                                           
41 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, 
South Africa, 4 Sept. 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20: 
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_PoI_PD/English/POITOC.htm>. Para. 81.   
42 World Summit for Social Development Copenhagen Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995), para. 28.   
43 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, UN Doc. A/C. 48/14 (1972), 11 ILM 1461 (1972) Principle 
23.   
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shall be given special priority. International actions in the field of environment and 
development should also address the interests and needs of all countries.44 
 
It is evident from the above provisions that the underlying rationale for CBDR is to 
promote distributive equity between developing and developed countries. CBDR acts as 
an incentive for developing countries’ compliance with their obligations under a given 
international instrument.45  
 
Finally, differentiated responsibility has been expressed in international case law, as 
demonstrated below. In the Shrimp/Turtle case,46  which involved  an import ban 
imposed by the United States  on Shrimp  not caught  with US-approved   Turtle 
Excluder  Devices (TEDs)  in order to protect certain species  of sea  turtle  whose 
existence  was  being threatened  by commercial shrimp harvesting.  The issue was 
whether  the ban was a protectionist measure designed  to support the American shrimp 
industry.  The principle of CBDR was implicit in the language  of the appellate body, it 
stated interalia that: “We believe that discrimination results not only when countries in 
which the same conditions prevail are differently treated, but also when the application of 
the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the 
regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting countries.”  
Differential treatement here can be inferred from the appellate panel’s use of the word 
“appropriateness.” 
 
CBDR was however expressly stated by the WTO  Panel in the same case  to the effect 
that States have common but differentiated responsibilities to conserve and protect the 
environment.47 
 
                                                           
44 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1, (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992), Principle 6.   
45 Hepburn and Imran., supra. note  34. 
46 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 20 September 1999, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS58/AB/R (Appellate Body Report).   
47 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 15 June 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS58/RW (Panel Report), para. 7.2.   
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CBDR was  also invoked by the Appellate Body  in the Asbestos case.48 In determining  
whether  a trade measure was  necessary ” to meet a country’s  health policy goals, the 
appellate body defined ”reasonably available altertantivess” and inter alia concluded that 
reasonably available  alternatives are measures that a country  could reasonably  be 
expected to employ.49 It therefore follows froms this observation that if a proposed 
altertative  is beyond  the means  of a developing country, that country does not have to 
implement it but may adopt  the trade measure in dispute as a ”necessary” one. This in 
effect is differential treatment.50  
 
Having given  the background of the principle of CBDR,  this study will then focus on 
the principle of CBDR  in the Climate Change Legal Framework. The remainder of this 
chapter deals with the research questions , the objectives , justification of the study, 
methodology and scope.  Chapter two is the main thrust of this study, it  describes the 
principle of CBDR  in the Climate change legal framework, chapter three examines the 
challenges of  CBDR in  the Climate Regime , chapters four  and five  deal with 
recommendations and conclusions respectively. 
1.1 Objectives and research questions 
This study set out to achieve the following objectives: to examine how the principle of 
CBDR is applied in the international climate change legal framework, To examine the 
origin and content of the principle of CBDR, to explain how the principle of CBDR is 
applied in the international climate change legal regime, to examine new developments as 
regards the principle of CBDR, to assess the challenges of the Principle of CBDR in the 
Climate Regime, to make recommendations for the effective application of the principle 
of CBDR in the Climate Regime. 
 
To achieve the above objectives, the study was guided by the following research 
questions: how is the principle of CBDR applied in the international climate change legal 
                                                           
48 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (Complaint by 
Canada), 12 March 2001, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (Appellate Body Report), para. 169.   
49 Id. para. 69. 
50 Id. para. 170. 
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framework?, What is the origin and content of the principle of CBDR?, how is the 
principle of CBDR applied in the international climate change legal framework?, what 
are the new developments as regards CBDR in the Climate Regime.?, what are the 
challenges of the Principle of  CBDR in the climate change regime?, how can CBDR be 
applied effectively and efficiently in the Climate Regime?. 
 
1.2 The importance and justification of the study 
There is limited literature on this principle in a specific legal regime.  This study aims to 
examine how the principle of CBDR is applied in the Climate Change Legal Framework.  
This study is further justified by the evolving nature of the principle of CBDR in the 
Climate regime. The thesis highlights the new developments of CBDR.  
 
1.3 Methodological overview 
The study relied mainly on the   qualitative method to examine the principle of CBDR as 
applied in general environmental law. This study relied on primary and secondary 
sources of information. Primary sources included materials from the library on climate 
change. Library text books provided information on the theories of the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities. Internet research provided access to recent 
publications on the principle of CBDR. Additionally, interviews with some law 
professors were conducted to get their views on the principle of CBDR. 
 
2   The principle of CBDR  in the international climate change legal framework 
2.1 Common responsibility in the climate regime  
Common responsibility in general has already been discussed in details in chapter one.  
Suffice it to mention here that Common responsibility in the Climate regime is  rooted  in the 
principle of cooperation  which  inter alia  states that  States are obliged , in the spirit  of 
solidarity , to cooperate in preventing  transboundary pollution.51 The common responsibility   
                                                           
51 Principle 24 of the Stockholm Declaration 1972, Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration 1992, GA Res. 2995 (1972). 
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primarily involves   an obligation to cooperate to conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of Earth’s ecosystem.52   
 
The 1992 FCCC echoes this common responsibility in no uncertain terms thus: The Parties 
to this Convention, Acknowledging that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects 
are a common concern of humankind.53  According, the FCCC aims to stabilize greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system’.54 To achieve this objective the principle of, common 
responsibility in the climate change regime incorporates states’ historical contributions to 
global environmental degradation and embraces fairness and justice elements to be taken into 
account when devising relevant legal commitments.55 This results in differential treatment 
which is discussed in the next subsections.  
 
2.2 Differentiated responsibility in the climate regime 
In the Climate Regime , differentiated  responsibility  derives  from the differing  
contributions of  states  to climate change  and the differing capacities  of states  to take 
remedial measures. At the Rio, parties acknowledged the contributions of industrial countries 
to the global crisis.56 It is against this background that some scholars have deduced that the 
legal basis for the transfer of technology and financial resources from the industrial to 
developing countries under the principle of CBDR is entitlement rather than need.57 
                                                           
52 Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration  1992. 
53 UNFCCC , Para 1. 
54 Article 2 FCCC, preamble to the Kyoto Protocol. 
55 Sands,  supra note 3 , at 218-219. 
56  Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment  in International  Environmental Law , (Oxford : Oxford University 
Press 2006) p 136. 
 
57 Chowdhury, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Environmental Law  from Stockholm 
to Rio’, in Sustainable  Development  and Good Governance  (Konrad Ginther et al.eds., 1995), 322, 333-4. 
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2.3 Arguments for CBDR in the climate regime 
2.3.1 The equity and the polluter pays principles 
The argument advanced by developing country parties is  that  owing to the fact  that 
industrial  countries  bear the overwhelming  responsibility for historical GHG emissions  
they should  bear the primary  burden of averting  climate change. 
In terms of per capita entitlements.  Proponents of this school of thought argue that the most 
important criteria for deciding the rights  to environmental space is the per capita since this is  
a direct measure of human welfare on ground that  the atmosphere  is a common heritage of 
humankind , equity has  to be the fundamental basis for its management’.58 
The notion of ‘carbon debt’ is also related to the per capita argument.  According to the 
notion of carbon debt, those countries and populations that use more than their fair share of 
the atmosphere, and contribute more to the damaging effects of global warming, are running 
up a debt to those countries that use less than their fair allocation.59  
It is on the basis of the foregoing proposition that  developing countries are unanimous in 
arguing that  the debt industrialized countries owe to  the global community for climate, 
erases  the moral legitimacy to keep holding  poor developing  countries hostage  to their 
own much smaller, but still unpayable , financial debts’.60 In addition proponents of this 
school of thought also argue that it provides moral legitimacy to claims for significant new 
resources and technology from industrial countries to help poor countries affected by the 
increasingly volatile and uncertain global environment.61 
2.3.2 The economic and capacity argument 
Vulnerability to Climate Change differs from country to country.62  Impacts of climate  
change  are a product  of the degree and nature  of physical  change , the degree  to which  
the society  depends  on the natural  resources  affected and its institutional and social  
                                                           
58 Saifuddin Soz, ‘India Rejects Incorporation  of New Environmental Commitments for Developing Counties’, 
Address to the UNFCCC (8 December 1997), available at: www.indianembassy.org/policy/Environment/soz.htm.  
59 Who owes Who: Climate Change, Debt, Equity and Survival (Christian Aid, 1999). 
60 Marcela  Valente, ‘Argentine  President Heats  up North-South Debate,’ (Inter Press Service News Agency, 15 
Dec. 15, 2004). 
61 Id.  
62 Rajamani, supra note 56, at 178-179. 
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capabilities  for handling  change. 63In hotter  climates and for developing  countries  with  
economies  that depend  more heavily  on natural  resources , the impacts  are widely  
expected to be adverse  partly because institutional and social structures  tend  to be  weaker  
and hence  less able to cope with change.64  Developing countries also have fewer financial 
resources for investing in robust infrastructure that are resilient to the adverse effects of 
Climate Change.65 
 
Accordingly, capacity to take remedial measures is one of the criteria for differentiating 
between countries under the CBDR principle.66  Under the Rio Declaration, industrial 
countries’ responsibility is premised on their superior technologies and financial resources 
and in the FCCC it is based on their respective capabilities.67 
The capacity criterion  in the  CBDR principle  builds on the polluter pays principle68which 
inter alia requires that  the costs of pollution  should be  borne  by the person or persons  
responsible for  causing  the pollution.69 The capacity criterion is closely linked to the past, 
current, and future contributions criterion.70 
However the validity of this argument is in question given the fact that greenhouse gas 
emissions of developing country parties are rapidly increasing and are expected to surpass 
emissions of the United States and other [developed] counties as early as 2015. In fact, 
developing world emissions began to outpace developed emissions in 2005, and they are 
projected to continue increasing seven times faster than in the developed world.71 China 
                                                           
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 148 
67 Rio Declaration,  Principle 7 , FCCC article 3. 
68 Rio Principle 6. 
69 Philippe Sands, ‘International Law in the Field of Sustainable  Development :Emerging  Legal Principles,’ in 
Sustainable Development and International Law (Winfield Lang ed.,1995), 53, 66.  
70 Rajamani, supra note 56 at 149. 
71 Energy Information Administration, "International Energy Outlook 2009," Chapter 8, 
athttp://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/emissions.html (Nov. 2, 2009). 
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alone now out-emits the U.S., and its emissions growth through 2030 is projected to be nine 
times higher than that of the U.S.72 
In effect, any reduction in emissions from developed nations would be rendered moot by 
burgeoning emissions from developing nations even more so if developed-nation constraints 
shift economic activity to exempted nations.73 
2.4 Arguments against CBDR in the climate regime 
2.4.1 The fairness argument 
Developed countries led by the US argue that developing countries would have an unfair 
economic advantage if they did not face the same restrictions as annex 1 parties. The 
unfairness would manifest itself through export of jobs and industries to developing 
nations and the climate change treaty would prove ineffective without developing country 
participation.74 
 
The views of the US are express in no uncertain terms in the Byrd-Hagel  Resolution of 
the 1997  which inter alia forbids  the United States  from signing any legal agreement 
regarding the FCCC that would ‘mandate new commitments to limit or reduce 
greenhouse  gas emissions  for Annex I countries , unless the protocol or  other 
agreement  also mandates  new specific scheduled commitments  to limit or reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions for developing country Parties  within the  same compliance 
period.75  
 
The Byrd-Hagel Resolution calls for a fair sharing of the burden which requires binding 
targets for the developing world that begin at the same time as the industrial world but 
                                                           
72 Id. Figs. 83 and 84. 
73 David Kreutzer et al., The Economic Consequences of Waxman-Markey: An Analysis of the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act of 2009, Heritage Foundation Center for Data Analysis Report No. CDA09-04 (Aug. 6, 
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74 Paul G. Harris, OCEES Research Paper , Understanding America’s Climate Change Policy: Real politik, 
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75 Senate Resolution 98, 25 July 1997. 
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incorporates flexibility for developing countries with regards to targets timing and 
breadth of commitments.76  
The Byrd-Hagel Resolution represents the official U.S. policy on Climate Change and 
serves as the overarching guidelines for discussing any new climate treaty. The Senate 
meant for its resolution to apply to all future global warming negotiations.77 
Therefore, the Climate Regime is unfair to developed countries to the extent that the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol thereto exempt 77 percent of all countries from any 
obligations.  Countries like China, India, Mexico, and Brazil are completely unfettered by 
the Treaty. This gives them a competitive advantage of cheap labour, lower production 
costs, and lower environmental, health and safety standards. Hence these countries will 
be free to develop and pollute all they want, while the economy of developed countries 
goes into deep freeze.78 
2.5 CBDR in the climate regime  
CBDR in the climate regime will be discussed under three main themes. First, provisions 
that differentiate between industrial and developing countries with respect to the  central 
obligations  contained  in the treaty, such as  emission reduction targets; second 
provisions  that differentiate  between industrial and developing  countries with respect  
to implementation , such as delayed compliance  schedules, permission  to adopt 
subsequent base years, delayed reporting schedules, and  soft approaches to non-
compliance, and, third, provisions that grant assistance, intera alia financial and 
technological. 
The next sections give a detailed examination of differential treatment in the climate 
regime on the basis of the three themes above mentioned. 
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77 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., emphasis mine.  
78 Benito Muller , Congressional  Climate Change  Hearings: Comedy or Tragedy? A Prime for Aliens (Oxford 
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2.5.1 Provisions that differentiate between countries with respect to the central obligations 
of the treaty 
The central obligations of a treaty have been defined to mean those obligations which 
when executed, fulfill the purpose(s) or objective(s) of the treaty.79 In the context of the 
climate regime, the FCCC aims to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’.80  
 
This goal is to be achieved through mitigation which is a preserve of industrial countries. 
Accordingly, the FCCC requires  industrial countries to undertake policies and measures 
on the mitigation of climate change  and to communicate  detailed information on such 
policies and measures  with the aim  of returning by 2000, individually or jointly , to the 
1990 levels of anthropogenic emissions of Co2  and other GHGs.81 Again this obligation 
falls on industrial countries and from the use of the word ‘shall’ it is  evident that it is 
mandatory unlike the  obligation to mitigate  emissions which   has been interpreted as an 
‘aim’ and a ‘quasi-target and ‘quasi-timetable.82   
 
Similarly, under the Kyoto Protocol, the main obligations are exclusive to industrial 
countries. Industrial countries are required under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol to 
individually or jointly ensure  that their aggregate  anthropogenic CO2 equivalent 
emissions of certain  GHGs83 do not  exceed their  assigned amounts, calculated  pursuant  
to their quantified  emission  limitation  and reduction  commitments inscribed in Annex  
B with a view  to reducing  their overall  emissions  of such  gases  by at least  5% below 
1990  levels  in the commitment period 2008-12.84 Like  the FCCC, the Kyoto Protocol 
uses an obligatory language by adopting the phrase ‘Parties shall’.85  Furthermore, under 
                                                           
79 Rajamani, supra note 56 , at 191.  
80 UNFCCC art. 2 .  Preamble to the Kyoto Protocol. 
81  UNFCCC. art.  4(2)(a) and (b) FCCC. 
82 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The United Nations  Framework Convention on Climate Change:  A commentary’, 18 Y.J . 
Int’L L. 451, 516 (1993). 
83  Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol. 
84 Kyoto Protocol art. 3(1). 
85 Id. 
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article 3(2), parties are required by 2005 to have made demonstrable progress in 
achieving the commitments under the Protocol. 
 
The exclusion of developing countries from the obligations and commitments under both 
the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol is a clear demonstration of differential treatment under 
the climate regime. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol in its Article 6(2) makes provision for 
industrial countries to advance   commitments in subsequent periods. Accordingly, the 
Protocol states that ‘commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I 
shall be established in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol.’86  
 
In terms of implementation, the Kyoto Protocol puts in place a mechanism for realizing    
Annex I commitments. The Protocol enjoins  Annex I countries  to establish national 
systems  for the estimation  of anthropogenic  emissions  by sources  and removals  by 
sinks  of GHGs.87 It also requires them to communicate  as part  of their national  
inventories  and national  communications  information relevant  for the purposes  of 
ensuring  compliance  with their  mitigation commitments.88 This information is then 
reviewed by Expert Review Teams.89 
 
The Kyoto Protocol creates three mechanisms for industrial countries to meet their 
mitigation commitments, of these three mechanisms only the Clean Development 
Mechanism (hereinafter CDM) is applicable to developing countries. Article 6 provides 
for Joint Implementation which is intended for Parties included in Annex I’90 and 
Emissions Trading described in Article 17 is restricted to ‘Parties included in Annex B’. 
 
The origin of  CDM can be traced  to  a Brazilian Proposal  for a Clean Development  
Fund that sought  to impose  financial  penalties  on Annex  I parties  for falling into  
non-compliance, and  to recycle  the funds  to non-Annex I Parties for the purpose  of 
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addressing  climate change.91  In the course of the negotiations  Brazil’s Clean  
Development  Fund  underwent a metamorphosis  and emerged as  the CDM,92 which 
would give industrial  countries some  flexibility  in meeting their targets and involve  
developing  countries in emissions mitigation efforts. 
 
CDM signifies the involvement of developing countries in the mitigation endeavour. The 
participation of developing countries in the CDM aims to further Annex I Protocol 
commitments as well as further   non annex I FCCC commitments. The underlying 
rationale for CDM as stated in Article 12(2) of the Kyoto Protocol is to ‘ assist  Parties  
not included  in Annex I  in achieving  sustainable  development  and in contributing  to 
the ultimate objective  of the Convention, and  to  assist Parties  included in Annex I  in 
achieving  compliance  with their  quantified  emission  limitation and reduction 
commitments  under Article 3.’ The obligations of the developing countries is defined 
under the FCCC to include inter alia sustainable development which is to be attained by 
their participation in the CDM’s emissions reductions thereby contributing to the ultimate 
objective of the FCCC. On the other hand, industrial countries’ participation in the CDM 
is in furtherance of their Protocol targets.93 
 
It is evident from the distinction between the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
Commitments that the CBDR is at play with the heaviest responsibility lying on 
industrial countries even under CDM whose purpose as indicated above is to inter alia 
further Annex I commitments.  
 
2.5.2 Provisions that differentiate between countries with respect to the implementation of 
the treaty 
The relevant provisions are discussed in six categories. The first category is provisions that 
provide a context of differential treatment to implement which are contained in the 
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preambular and operational provisions.  Differential treatment can be deduced from the 
preamble to the FCCC. The preamble inter alia affirms the contribution of industrial 
countries to the GHG by observing that the ‘largest share of historical and current global 
emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries’.94 It further notes that 
the ‘global nature  of climate change  calls for…widest possible participation by all 
countries…in accordance with their common but differentiated  responsibilities  and 
respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions.’95Accordingly, developed 
countries are called upon to take immediate action,’ ‘as a first  step towards comprehensive  
response strategies  at the global, national and where agreed, regional levels.’96   
 
It is submitted that the CBDR principle is the result of a compromise between industrial and 
developing countries.97  Developing  countries had sought  inclusion of  the ‘main 
responsibility principle,’ part of GA Resolution 44/228 convening  UNCED,  and a direct 
emanation  of the polluter  pays  principle, which posits  that since the climate  problem 
results  primarily from the  profligate  lifestyles, of industrial countries , they should  bear  
the main responsibility for combating it.98 Instead the preamble contains the CBDR 
principle  which , at least  in the Preamble , does  not specify  on what  basis  differentiation  
is to be  made between  countries  capability and/or culpability. 
 
In the Preamble, developing countries enjoy favourable treatment. It provides that  ‘per 
capita emissions  in developing  countries are still relatively low and that the share  of 
global  emissions originating  in developing  countries will grow  to meet  their social  and 
development  needs.’99 The  reference  to ‘per capita emissions’  originated in an Indian  
proposal that  the FCCC should promote  the convergence  of GHG emissions  at a common  
per capita level.100  
                                                           
94 Preamble to the UNFCCC , para 3. 
95 Id. para 6. 
96 Id. para.18 .   
97 Rajamani, supra note  56, at 194. 
98 Beijing Declaration on Environment and Development, 19 June 1991 reprinted in 21 Envtl Pol’y L.267(1991). 
99 UNFCCC Preamble,  supra note 94. 
100  Consolidated  Working  Document, in  Report  of the Intergovernmental  Negotiating Committee for a 
Framework  Convention  on the Work  of Its  Fourth Session, A/AC.237/15 Annex II (1991)at 229. 
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The reference to the emissions growth was originally proposed as a principle and couched 
in mandatory terms.101 Nevertheless , the acknowledgement that ‘ per capita’  vision  has 
some  place in the  galaxy of possible  ideological visions  to tackle the climate  change  
problem is significant. The acknowledgement that emissions from developing countries will 
grow is also significant. In the context of the ultimate objective of the FCCC, ‘stabilization 
of the greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere’,102 such an acknowledgement can be 
interpreted as recognition, broadly, of what has come to be known as the ‘contraction and 
convergence’ vision.103 This vision envisages as a first step  convergence  over time  in per 
capita  GHG emissions  or entitlements, such  that  emissions  from developing  countries  
will grow, while those from industrial  countries  will decrease. After convergence, all 
countries would contract their GHG emissions equally until the necessary contraction limit 
is reached. No inflation of National Budgets   in response to the rising populations would be 
permitted after an agreed set date.104 
 
Further, the preamble underlines the importance of social and economic development to 
developing countries.  It acknowledges  that ‘environmental standards applied  by some 
countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted  economic  and social cost to other 
countries, in particular  developing countries’,105and climate response  measures should take 
into account ‘the legitimate  priority  needs  of developing  countries  for the achievement  
of sustained  economic growth and the eradication of poverty.’106 
 
The next set of provisions are the preambular provisions, a number of operational 
provisions of the FCCC contain references to the special needs and particular circumstances 
of developing countries. It has been observed that a lot of controversy surrounds, the 
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provision containing the CBDR principle and highlighting industrial countries’ 
leadership.107 
 
Article 3 of FCCC provides for the Principles.  It proceeds by stating that  that  ‘Parties  
should protect  the climate system  for the benefit  of present  and future generations  of 
humankind, on the basis of equity and in  accordance  with their  common but differentiated   
responsibilities  and respective capabilities.’108 It then calls upon industrial countries to 
‘take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof’.109 It further 
stresses that ‘full consideration’ be given to ‘specific needs and special circumstances of 
developing country Parties’.110 
 
Article 3 was opposed by developed countries on grounds that it could, as an operational 
rather than a preambular provision,111 introduce a note of uncertainty into the context of the 
FCCC obligations.  The US delegation was concerned  that this  Article  could create  
specific commitments  beyond those set out  in Article 4, introduced  various  amendments 
to circumscribe  the legal  potential  of Article 3: a chapeau  was added, specifying that the 
principles  were to ‘guide’  the parties in their  actions  under the FCCC;  the term ‘States’  
was  replaced by ‘Parties’; and the term ‘inter alia’ was added  to the chapeau   to indicate  
that the  Parties  may take  into account  principles  other  than  those  listed in Article 3 in 
implementing  the FCCC.112 It has been noted that  that  these three  modifications  were 
intended  to forestall  arguments  that the principles  in Article 3 are  part of  customary  
international  law  and bind  states generally.113 Instead the principles clearly apply only to 
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the parties and only in relation to the FCCC, not as general law.114 The United States also 
removed any reference to the term ‘principles’ in the FCCC. As a result, the term appears 
only in the title of Article 3 and, at the suggestion of the United States, a footnote was added 
stating that ‘(t)itles of articles are included  solely to assist the reader.’115 
 
The notions of  ‘common  but differentiated  responsibility  and respective  capabilities’ and 
‘industrial  countries leadership’ are couched  in discretionary  and guiding  rather  than 
prescriptive  language116 and apply  only to parties in relation  to the FCCC.  While these 
notions are neither legally binding nor indeed, as some claim, customary international law, 
they still constitute a significant force within the climate regime. The notion of common but 
differentiated responsibilities has significant legal implications. It is the context within 
which international environmental law functions, such that this principle, inter alia, forms 
the foundation of the burden-sharing arrangements crafted in different environmental 
treaties. And it is part of the conceptual apparatus of the climate regime such that it forms 
the basis for the interpretation of existing obligations and the elaboration of future 
international legal obligations within the regime.117 It is in short, the overarching principle 
guiding the future development of the climate regime.118 
 
Under CBDR,  the limited  capacity of developing countries-as a whole-to respond  to 
climate change is recognized  in that they are recipients  of financial assistance119 and 
technology  transfer;120 their  particular concerns and needs  are taken into  account in 
improving  their capabilities  in research  and systematic  observations;121 they are the 
particular focus  of efforts  to develop and implement  education and training  programmes, 
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strengthen national institutions, and train experts;122 and they are provided  with assistance  
by the FCCC Secretariat in the compilation and communication of information.123  
 
CBDR recognizes the special needs and circumstances of certain categories of countries. 
Industrial countries are required to assist the ‘developing country Parties that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change’ in meeting costs of 
adaptation to adverse effects.124  
 
Parties  are required   to give full consideration  to what actions  are necessary to meet  the 
specific  needs and concerns  of developing countries arising  from the adverse  effects  of 
climate change and/or the impact  of the implementation of response measures, especially 
on a variety of groups of countries ranging from ‘small island countries’ to ‘countries whose 
economies are highly dependent  on income  generated  from fossil fuels’.125 Parties  are to  
take full account  of the specific  needs and special  situations  of ‘least  developed 
countries’ in actions  with respect  to funding  and transfer of technology.126 These 
particular  groups of developing countries find mention in Article 3(14) and 2(3) of the 
protocol  that require  Parties to implement  the Kyoto commitments  in such a way as  to 
minimize adverse  social , environmental , and economic  impacts  on developing countries, 
in particular the groups  identified  in Article  4 (8) and (9) FCCC.127  
 
Parties are required to consider actions such as establishment of funding, insurance and 
technology transfer.128 A specific reference  is also made  to particular  continents, for 
instance , cooperation  is urged  in developing and elaborating appropriate  and integrated  
plans for coastal  zone management , water resources and agriculture, and for  the protection  
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and rehabilitation  of areas, particularly in Africa, affected  by drought  and desertification, 
as well as floods.129 
 
The special circumstances and needs of Economies in Transition (EITs) are recognized both 
under the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.  Articles 4(6) and   3(6) of the FCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol respectively enunciate that in the implementation of their commitments the 
‘Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy’ are 
to be allowed ‘a certain degree of flexibility.’  
 
 Article 4(10) FCCC has been interpreted to apply to some industrial countries.130 It  
requires  Parties  ‘ to take into consideration in the implementation  of the commitments of 
the Convention  the situation  of  Parties, particularly  developing country  Parties , with 
economies that are vulnerable  to the  adverse effects of the implementation  of measures  to 
respond  to climate change’.131 Since  developing countries  that are highly  dependent  on 
fossil  fuels  are already  entitled to special  consideration  under Article 4 (8), Article  4(10) 
is unique in as far as  it could be interpreted  to apply  to industrial  countries  that produce  
fossil  fuel (such as Australia , Russia, and  the United States).132 It is however unlikely that 
these countries will enjoy such special consideration in mitigation of their responsibilities 
under the regime.  
 
The Second category deals with language permitting flexibility. Differential treatment in 
both the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol can be inferred from language permitting flexibility 
and hence, differentiate treatment in implementation.  
 
Under Article 4 of the FCCC, Parties are required   to fulfil  commitments  ‘taking  into 
account’ a series  of considerations  including their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific  national and regional development priorities, objectives , 
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and circumstances.133 Further, Parties are required to take climate considerations into 
account ‘to the extent feasible’ in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies 
and actions.134 In choosing the information to be submitted in their national 
communications, again, Parties have some leeway. Parties are required to submit national 
inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all GHGs not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, ‘to the extent its capacities permit’.135 Parties can 
submit any other information ‘the Party considers relevant to the achievement of the 
objective of the Convention and suitable for inclusion in its communication, including, if 
feasible, material relevant for calculations of global emissions trends’.136 
 
The rationale for such flexible language is to provide developing countries with flexibility 
in implementation. However, industrial countries are also permitted flexibility in the 
implementation of their technology transfer commitment. Article 4(5) requires  industrial  
countries  to take ‘all practicable steps to promote , facilitate  and finance , as appropriate , 
the transfer  of , or access to , environmentally sound technologies and know-how’. This 
language is reiterated in Article 10(c) of the Protocol. 
 
The use of the phrase ‘as appropriate’ in the FCCC137 reflects flexibility to the COP or 
Parties, in taking particular actions.  The phrase ‘respective capacities’ is used to signify 
flexible language.138  
 
Article 2 of the Protocol requires Parties to initiate policies and measures to achieve their 
mitigation commitments, but these can be done ‘in accordance with (its) national 
circumstances’.139 The mitigation commitments  however are couched in mandatory 
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language, Parties ‘shall…(GHGs)…do not exceed  their assigned amounts….’140 Parties  
have to reach their mitigation targets in the 2008-12 commitment period and make 
‘demonstrable progress’ towards  this aim by 2005.141 
 
Under article 10 of the Protocol, Parties are required  ‘taking into  account  their common  
but differentiated  responsibilities  and their specific national and regional  development  
priorities, objectives and circumstances, without  introducing  any new commitments  for  
Parties  not included  in Annex I , but reaffirming existing  commitments under  Article 4, 
paragraph 1, of the  Convention , and continuing to advance  the implementation  of these  
commitments in order  to achieve  sustainable  development, taking into account Article 4, 
paragraphs 3,5 and 7, of  the Convention shall…142 
 
The precise implication of the term CBDR is yet to be determined. The reference to 
‘specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances’ is 
uncertain in its import. There are  neither standards  to  judge the legitimacy  of national  
and regional  development priorities  or objectives , nor are there methods  to determine  
which circumstances might be relevant.143 
 
Developing countries pushed for the use of language providing a context of differential 
treatment within Article 10 containing commitments for all Parties. Hence the phrases 
reminiscent of the Berlin Mandate, ‘without introducing any new commitments  for Parties  
not included  in Annex I…’ and the language  referencing  the FCCC commitments  on 
financial assistance  and technology transfer, and  linking developing  countries’ 
implementation to industrial  countries’ performance.144  
 
The sub-paragraphs of Article 10 of the Protocol also contain language providing significant 
flexibility to developing countries in implementation. All Parties are required to formulate 
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‘where appropriate and to the extent  possible national and where appropriate regional 
programmes…’145  Non-Annex  I Parties are asked  to include  in their  national  
communications ‘as appropriate , information  on programmes  which  contain  measures  
the Party believes contribute  to addressing climate change.’146 
 
Suffice it to trace the negotiating history of Article 10 of the Protocol. Developing countries 
argued that advancing the implementation of existing commitments would need to be 
coupled with similar advances in the implementation of financial commitments by industrial 
countries.147 
 
A proposal for the creation of a specific fund was discussed at length, but eventually 
discarded. Article 10 was however placed immediately prior to the article on the financial 
mechanism as a reflection that the two articles were linked: advancing commitments for 
developing countries would require increased financial support.148 
 
Flexible language is also used in Article 11 on the Protocol on financial mechanism. It 
provides that  the implementation  of the existing  commitments shall ‘take  into account  
the need for adequacy  and predictability  in the flow of funds  and the importance  of 
appropriate  burden sharing  among developed country Parties’.149 
 
It is submitted that flexibility here can be inferred from the lack of precision.  For instance, 
no rules exist to guide what constitutes an adequate and predictable flow of funds; and, no 
formula exists to determine what might be an appropriate sharing of the burden.150 
 
The COP serving as the Meeting of Parties (MOP) is mandated under Article 13(4) of the 
Protocol to keep under regular review the implementation of this Protocol, and make 
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decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation.  In performing some of its 
mandated actions, as for instance  with regard to exchange  of information on response 
measures adopted by the Parties  the COP/MOP is  required  to take into account  ‘the 
differing circumstances, responsibilities  and capabilities  of the Parties and their respective 
commitments under this Protocol’.151 
 
The third category is provisions that permit flexible time frames for implementation or 
delayed compliance schedules. The climate regime provides for time-dependent 
commitments. The first commitment period for Annex I countries was set for 2008-12, a 
period of ten years after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.152 In the interests of fairness, it 
is worth keeping this in mind in determining commitment periods for developing countries’ 
commitments. 
 
The fourth category consists of provisions that grant permission to adopt subsequent base 
years. Under Article 4(6) FCCC, EITs are given ‘certain degree of flexibility’…including 
with regard to the historical level of… (GHGs) ‘Chosen as a reference’ read with Article 
3(5) of the Protocol provides certain EITs153. The issue of base years for these countries is 
one that has significant consequences for the effectiveness of the regime. The concern over 
‘hot air trading’ has haunted the climate negotiations since the adoption of the Kyoto 
Protocol.154 The term ‘hot air’ was coined in the context of surplus emissions credits from 
Russia and Ukraine.155  Emissions from these countries are 30% below their 1990 levels due 
to economic restructuring. Stabilization targets for these countries imply that they have vast 
quantities of unused emissions credits that they could trade or bank.156  Figures from the 
FCCC Secretariat indicate that if all EITs trade their surplus air, the effort required by 
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Annex B Parties will go down from 5.2% to 3%.157 Although at the time, the flexibility  
provided  to certain  EITs was expected  to be exercised  to favour adoption  of base years 
subsequent  to 1990, it was  clear that earlier baselines could be  adopted  as well.158 For 
instance Bulgaria chose 1988, Hungary   1985-7, Poland 1988, Romania 1989, and Slovenia 
1986.159 
 
The fifth category is provisions that provide for delayed reporting schedules. The FCCC 
differentiates between industrial and developing countries both with respect to the required 
content of national communications (developing countries objected to the term reporting, as 
it appeared burdensome and intrusive160) and the time frame within which the 
communication is to be submitted. All parties are to communicate information on their 
national inventory of GHG emissions and removals to the extent their capabilities permit, as 
well as on the steps taken or planned to implement the FCCC.161 Annex I countries are also 
required to submit a detailed description of their policies and measures to implement their 
specific commitments, and an estimate of the effect of these measures and policies on their 
sources and sinks.162  Annex II countries are required to report on their transfers of financial 
resources and technology.163  
 
Developing countries are given considerable latitude in time to submit their initial reports. 
While industrial  countries  have six  months  to submit  their initial reports, developing 
countries  have  three years  and LDCs can submit  their initial  reports  at their 
discretion.164 Finally, developing countries are entitled to full financial support in preparing 
their reports, and can receive technical assistance on request.165  
 
                                                           
157 Farhana Yamin, ‘The  Kyoto Protocol: Origins, Assessment  and Future Challenges’, 7(2) Rev. Eur. Community  
& Int’L Entl.L.113 (1998). 
158 Rajamani, supra note 56 at 202. 
159 Information on National  Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data from Parties Including in Annex I to the Convention 
for the period 1990-2002, including the status of reporting, Executive  Summary, FCCC/CP/2004/5(2004) at 16.  
160 Bodansky supra note 82  at 544. 
161 UNFCCC art. 12(1) (a) and (b). 
162 Id. art. 12(2). 
163 UNFCCC art. 12(2), (3), and (4) FCCC. 
164 Id. art. 12(5). 
165 Id. art.12(7). 
33 
 
The Six categories are provisions that deal with compliance procedures. CBDR is also 
reflected in the compliance procedures of the climate regime. The rationale for compliance  
procedures in the context of  environmental treaties, is  to assist  defaulting  states return to 
compliance  rather than  to punish  them for non-compliance, but  these procedures , 
nevertheless , range from the coercive  to the facilitative.166  
 
The Kyoto Protocol compliance committee whose objective is to inter alia facilitate, 
promote and enforce compliance with Protocol Commitments167 is arguably the most 
rigorous of its kind,168 for the enforcement branch of the compliance committee has the 
power to impose penal consequences for non-compliance.169 Rigorous as this system is, in 
keeping with the nature and extent of differential treatment offered to developing countries 
in the climate regime, it contains a soft approach to non-compliance by developing 
countries.170 
 
In the decision authorizing the creation of the compliance committee, parties included 
implicit and explicit norms of differential treatment. Of the two branches of the compliance 
committee, only the facilitative branch applies to developing countries.171 The facilitative  
branch , which  is empowered  to provide  financial and  technical  assistance, and/ or 
advice, is  required  to do so’ taking into  account the principle of common  but  
differentiated  responsibilities and respective capabilities’.172 In addition, listed  among the  
consequences  that  the facilitative  branch  can apply is the  ‘formulation  of 
recommendations…taking into account Article 4, paragraph 7, of the  Convention’173-a 
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provision  stressing  the centrality  of financial  assistance  and technology transfer  to the 
environmental  compact  between  developing and industrial  countries. 
 
The inclusion of the CBDR principle in the decision text on the compliance system is an 
outcome of intense negotiations. Several industrial countries including Australia and the 
United States opposed the introduction of CBDR principle in this context. Australia noted 
that ‘it is not obvious to us what role such principles could play in a compliance system for 
the Kyoto Protocol’.174   
 
 The United States Argued that: “[i]t is unclear  whether  Parties  supporting  reflection  of 
the  principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ in the compliance  context  are 
seeking a recognition  that Parties  may have  different  substantive  obligations or  whether  
they mean  that Parties  with the same  type of obligations  might  be treated  differently  in 
terms  of non-compliance procedures/consequences because  of that principle. In our view, 
Parties that have undertaken the same type of obligation should be treated the same in terms 
of non-compliance.”175  
 
On the other hand, most developing countries  including  the AOSIS,176 China,177  Republic 
of Korea,178 Saudi Arabia,179 and South Africa,180advocated  inclusion of the  CBDR   
principle  in the text  on compliance , and in the  design  of the compliance system. China in 
particular stressed the need for the CBDR principle to ‘be acknowledged as a cornerstone of 
the system’.181 
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In constructing  the compliance  system such that  only the facilitative  branch  pertains  to 
developing  countries, Parties  ensured  that  the divergence  in substantive  obligations  
between  industrial  and developing  countries is reflected in the design of the system.  
 
The reference to CBDR, however, occurs in the text relating to the facilitative branch. The 
facilitative branch has overarching mandate to facilitate compliance with commitments, 
whether of developing or industrial countries. The CBDR principle, placed in this context, 
may well permit differential appreciation of broadly similar situations of potential non-
compliance by industrial and developing countries. It may also permit differential 
approaches to facilitation in this context. The additional reference to Article 4(7) FCCC 
substantiates this point.182 
 
The challenge to such compliance committee and its differential treatment is if developing 
countries take on mitigation commitments, assuming they do so without including 
themselves in Annex I, will they only be subject to the facilitative branch?  The decision, if 
applied as currently drafted, would only permit the compliance committee to facilitate and 
promote (but not enforce) developing country compliance with mitigation commitments. 
Much depends however on the nature and form that future commitments take. More 
broadly, it remains to be seen how, given   the lack of clarity on the precise meaning of 
CBDR in the context of the compliance system the principle will be operationalised.183  
 
2.5.3 Provisions that grant assistance 
The various forms of assistance under the climate regime are based on CBDR. The 
assistance envisaged under the climate regime includes: Financial assistance, technology 
transfer, capacity building as well as other forms of assistance. These forms of assistance 
are explained below.  
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First is financial assistance which is further subdivided into Costs and activities eligible 
for financial assistance and Multilateral funds/funding mechanisms.184 The costs and 
activities that are eligible for financial assistance take three forms. First, costs  in 
fulfilling  reporting  obligations; second, costs in  complying with more  general 
commitments  such as  with respect  to mitigation, education , and  awareness; and third,  
costs  incurred in adapting  to the adverse effects of climate change.  
 
Article 4(3) FCCC requires certain industrial countries to provide ‘new and additional 
financial resources’ to meet the ‘agreed full costs’ incurred by developing countries in 
complying with their reporting obligations.185 For general commitments under Article 
4(1), certain industrial countries are required to provide financial resources ‘to meet the 
agreed full incremental costs…’ By way of qualification  Article 4(3) further provides 
that ‘[t]he implementation  of these commitments  shall take  into account  the need for 
adequacy  and predictability  in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate 
burden sharing among the developed country Parties’.186 
 
It should be noted that this provision is constructed in mandatory rather than obligatory 
language (Developed Country Parties…shall provide’187).  The United States had argued 
initially that financial assistance should be voluntary rather mandatory,188 as well created 
a precedent the developing countries were not about to ignore.189 The contributions under 
the FCCC were made mandatory. The level of funding however was left unspecified and 
each industrial country can determine for itself the size of its financial contribution. 
 
Numerous terms merit elaboration. The  term ‘new and additional  financial  resources,’ 
nowhere defined , is intended  to address  the developing  country  concern  that existing  
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development aid will be diverted  to climate activities.190 ‘Additional’ therefore implies 
additional to Oversees Development Assistance (ODA). At UNCED developing countries 
obtained a commitment of 0.7% of GNP from industrial countries. At  the parallel  
climate  negotiations  they ensured  that the financial  resources  provided  for climate  
activities  would be additional  to such ODA.191  
 
The terms ‘agreed full costs’ and ‘agreed full incremental costs’ are also left undefined. 
These terms and their placement in this article however are a reflection of the industrial 
countries’ reluctance to underwrite indeterminate costs. Industrial  countries were willing  
to underwrite  developing countries’ reporting  obligations  as the costs  involved  are 
determinate , but  they were  unwilling  to underwrite  the implementation of more  
general commitments under Article 4(1) and elsewhere, as these were  indeterminate  and 
could cover , for   instance , costs  that developing  countries  might incur  in converting  
from coal  to nuclear plants.192  The term ‘incremental’ implies something added.  
However, to determine what might be added, it is essential to establish a benchmark or a 
baseline.  Since  no such  baseline  is available, the focus of this  provision is on  the term 
‘agreed’ such  that  whatever  the nature  of the cost  an agreement  would have  to be 
entered  into between  industrial  and developing  countries  to ensure that  it is covered. 
 
The third category of costs that industrial countries agreed to cover, at the insistence of 
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), are adaptation costs. Article 4(4) FCCC 
requires  certain industrial countries  to ‘assist  developing country Parties  that are 
particularly  vulnerable to  the adverse effects’ of climate change  in  meeting  the costs  
of adaptation  to those adverse effects.’  Although this provision is also formulated in 
mandatory terms (‘Developed Country Parties…shall’), it can be distinguished from the 
commitment in Article 4(3). In the former, Parties are required to ‘provide’, in the latter 
Parties are required to ‘assist’. Article 4(4) however does not specify the extent of 
‘assistance’ available. It clearly does not cover full costs, and it is unclear whether it 
                                                           
190 Bodansky supra note 82 at 526, Rajamani supra note 54 at 206. 
191 Rajamani  supra note 56 at 206. 
192 Bodansky supra note 82 at  526. 
38 
 
covers ‘full incremental costs’ or merely costs as agreed. And additional concern with 
respect to adaption costs is in proving causality. It might be difficult  for members  of 
AOSIS to prove  that the adverse  effects  suffered  are indeed  linked  to climate  change 
and are not merely  the by-product of a naturally changing climate.193 
 
In terms of multilateral funds/funding mechanisms; Article 11 FCCC provides for 
financial mechanism and defines addresses a financial mechanism by setting forth the 
mechanism’s general characteristics and governance. 
 
The views of developing and developed countries as regards financial mechanism differ 
significantly. On the one hand, developing countries have advocated a new financial 
mechanism that would operate under the authority of the COP, and on the other hand 
industrial countries have been insistent on their desire to channel financial assistance 
through the existing GEF.194  
 
The justification for the developing countries’ stand is that  the provision of  financial 
assistance  to developing countries  under the  FCCC is an obligation, not an act  of 
charity , and  therefore  donor countries  do not have a right to control  the financial 
mechanism, which  would be  the case if existing  institutions are co-opted  into the 
process, as  these existing  financial institutions  are dominated  by industrial countries.195 
 
Developing countries opposed in particular the use of the GEF as its decision-making 
was neither transparent nor democratic.196 Article 11 reflects a compromise:197 it defines 
a financial mechanism accountable to the COP, but whose operation is entrusted to one or 
more existing international entities. The financial mechanism is required to have 
equitable and balanced representation of all Parties within the transparent system of 
governance. 
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Article 11  is to be  read  in conjunction  with Article 21(3) which  entrusts  the  GEF  
with the operation  of the financial  mechanism  on an interim basis. Article 21(3) also 
requires the GEF to be appropriately restructured and its membership made universal to 
enable it to fulfil the requirements of Article 11. 
 
The GEF, created in 1991, was restructured in 1994 in response to this mandate.  The 
Restructured GEF consists of an Assembly, a Council, and a Secretariat.  The Assembly, 
with  policy and implementation review functions,  consists  of representatives  of all 
participants, while  the Council, with operational  and decision-making functions, 
consists of  thirty-two members-sixteen  from developing  countries, fourteen from  
industrial countries , and two  from EITs.198  
 
The voting system moved from one dollar one vote to a double-weighted majority 
representing both a 60% majority of the total number of participants and a 60% majority 
of the total contributions. 199The Restructured GEF has operated the financial mechanism 
of the FCCC ever since. Developing countries have, however continued to express 
dissatisfaction with the GEF. This  dissatisfaction  is reflected , for instance , in the fact 
that developing countries  ensure that the  COP refers  to the GEF as ‘an operating entity’ 
of the financial  mechanism,200 rather  than formally acknowledging  it as  the operating  
entity of the Conventions’ financial Mechanism.201 In general, developing countries are 
concerned with what they perceive  as the continued  domination  of the donor  countries  
and the World Bank,202 and in particular  they are concerned  with the length  of the GEF 
project cycle , the extent  of bureaucracy  involved  in it , and  the complicated  nature of  
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project  approval process203 requiring strict  adherence  to global-local  distinctions  and 
arcane  definitions of ‘incremental costs.’204 
 
At COP-7, after a few years of negotiation, Parties agreed to create a series of funds that 
would address some of these concerns.  Three funds were created as a result of the Bonn 
Agreement and Marrakesh Accords, 2001. First is the Special Climate  Change Fund to 
finance activities  in adaptation; technology transfer; energy , transport, industry , 
agriculture, forestry , and  waste management; and activities  to assist fossil-fuel  
dependent  developing countries  to diversify their economies205, second is Least 
Developed Countries Fund to support a work programme for LDCs including on 
adaptation,206 third, Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund to finance concrete adaptation 
projects and programmes in developing country Protocol Parties.207 
 
The special Climate Change Fund,208 the LDCs Fund,209 and the Kyoto Protocol 
Adaptation Fund210 are to be operated by ‘an entity’ entrusted with the operation of the 
financial mechanism of the Convention. The identity of the ‘entity’ was deliberately left 
unspecified.211 On the Special Climate Change  Fund , in its  initial guidance  to the GEF, 
the  COP  requested  the GEF  to adopt  ‘ streamlined  procedures’ and to ensure  
financial separation  of this fund from others.212 In its further guidance, the COP 
requested the GEF to ensure ‘expedited access’, and to mobilize resources to 
operationalize the Fund ‘without delay’.213 
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On the LDCs  Fund, in its initial  guidance , the COP  requested  the GEF  to ‘ensure the 
speedy release and disbursement of funds  and timely  assistance  for the preparation  of 
national adaptation programmes of action.’214 In its further guidance, Parties requested 
the GEF to ensure ‘a country-driven approach, in line with national priorities,’ and to take 
into account ‘guidelines for expedited support’.215 
 
The second form of assistance is technology transfer.  Article 4(5)FCCC requires certain 
industrial countries  to promote , facilitate  and finance the transfer  of environmentally 
sound  technologies  and know-how to developing  country Parties to enable them to 
implement  the provisions of the  FCCC.216 The provision however is ambiguous in some 
respects, and contains phrases that provide significant flexibility to industrial countries in 
implementing their technology transfer commitments. 
 
The ambiguity in this article relates to the identification of the donors and recipients of 
technology transfer. While it is clear that Annex II Parties are donors and developing 
countries are recipients, the position of the EITs is less clear.217  According to Article 
4(5), the parties responsible for technology transfer are ‘developed country Parties and 
other developed country Parties included in Annex II’. This appears to indicate that 
Annex I and Annex II Parties are responsible for technology transfer i.e. EITs are 
responsible for technology transfer as well. However, Article 4(5) identifies the recipients 
of technology transfer as ‘other Parties, particularly developing country Parties’. The 
term ‘other’ here refers to Parties other than ‘developed country Parties and other 
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developed country Parties included in Annex II’.218 Presumably those developed country 
Parties (not in Annex II) that are not donors can be recipients of technology transfer. It 
appears then that EITs can be considered both recipients and donors of technology 
transfer.  
 
 Article 4(5) of FCCC by way of permitting flexibility to industrial countries in their 
implementation requires industrial countries to ‘take all practicable steps’ to promote, 
facilitate, and finance ‘as appropriate’ the access to and transfer of technology. 
 
The Buenos Aires Plan of Action set in motion a consultative process aimed at achieving 
agreement on a framework for meaningful and effective actions to enhance 
implementation of Article 4(5).219 Parties prepared a draft framework for technology 
transfer in the lead-up to COP-6.220 The framework   contained in directives grouped 
around five themes: needs assessments, technology information, enabling environments, 
capacity building, and mechanisms for technology transfer.221 This framework was 
adopted at Marrakesh and is directed at breathing life into the technology transfer 
requirements of the FCCC.222 
 
The third form of assistance is capacity building .The FCCC is dominated by provisions 
on the necessity of meeting the specific needs and concerns of developing countries,223 
implicitly recognizing that the ability of a country to adapt to climate change and to 
mitigate GHG emissions depends upon the resources of its people and institutions.224 
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Capacity building refers to initiatives to develop and improve national, sub-regional, and 
regional capacities and capabilities for sustainable development.225 
 
While the Buenos  Aires  Plan  of Action  did not contain  a specific  decision  on 
capacity building , several  decisions  taken at COP-4 , particularly on technology  
transfer226  and adverse  effects,227contained  detailed  references  to the need  for 
capacity  building in developing countries. COP-5 crystallized the ambition resonating 
through these decisions, and urged that elements of a draft framework for capacity-
building activities, both in developing countries and EITs, were developed at COP-6 and 
adopted at Marrakesh. Although the utility of capacity building is recognized in other 
environmental treaties, the climate regime is unique in having negotiated a framework for 
capacity building in developing countries and EITs.228 
 
Finally, the climate regime recognizes that developing countries need financial assistance 
in participating in the negotiations, and that such participation is critical to an effective 
outcome.229 GA resolution 45/212 established a special  voluntary fund  in 1990 ‘to 
ensure that developing countries, in particular  the least developed  among them, as well  
as small island developing  countries, are able to participate fully and effectively in the 
negotiating process’.230 Such negotiation assistance has proven effective in bringing a 
large number of countries to the table and therefore in representing a wider range of 
interests. 
 
The climate regime also provides reporting assistance to developing countries.  Article 12 
(7) FCCC  requires  the COP to arrange  for technical and financial support  to 
developing countries  in compiling national communications, and Article 8(c) FCCC 
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requires  the FCCC Secretariat ‘to facilitate assistance to the Parties, particularly 
developing country Parties on request , in the compilation  and communication  of 
information’. 
 
2.6 CBDR at recent climate negotiations 
2.6.1 The Copenhagen Accord and CBDR 
At Copenhagen, the issues which had implications for the principle of CBDR were: 
comparability of action, incremental costs and Measurement, Reporting and Verification.  
The next subsections deal with these issues in detail. 
 
The notion of comparability of action which is a brain child of the Unites States requires 
comparability between the mitigation actions of industrialized and developing 
countries.231 This notion has far reaching implications for CBDR to the extent that it 
defeats the very essence of differentiation and therefore equity. The other aspect of this 
notion is for other Annex 1 countries to require comparability between their actions and 
those of the US.232 Comparability of action can be traced to the Bali Conference.  
 
At the Bali conference, developing countries pushed for what has been dubbed233 ‘a two 
track’ process to be reflected in the Bali Action Plan with a view to preserving strict 
differentiation. The ‘two track’ process would take the form of a legally binding Kyoto 
Protocol track for Annex 1 countries, and a “Long-Term Cooperative Action” (LCA) 
process for non-Annex 1 countries. According to developing countries, combining these 
two tracks would be pulling on a string that would unravel the entire architecture of the 
UNFCCC built around differentiation between the North and the South.234 To resolve this 
impasse, recourse was had to the ‘schedules approach proposed by Australia’. The 
schedules approach allowed each country to inscribe its national actions in a schedule 
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with provision for only a soft form of differentiation by action-economy-wide 
commitments versus a range of national actions-between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 
countries.235    
 
The Copenhagen Accord236 in a bid to reconcile differentiation and comparability allows 
for two schedules, one which will contain economy-wide emission targets by Annex 1 
countries, and the other which will document mitigation actions by non-Annex 1 
countries.237 The Copenhagen Accord redefines differentiation through the schedule 
approach, and allows for comparability by harmonizing downward and making less 
legally stringent necessary actions by all countries.238 
 
What is clear from the preceding discussion is that comparability of action has the effect 
of altering if not fully eroding differentiation and the underlying notion of distributive 
equity on which differentiation under the climate regime is built.239 Comparability of 
action also has far reaching implications for differentiation in terms of Measurement, 
Reporting and Verification (MRV). These implications are examined below in details. 
 
Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) is one of the consequences of the 
notion of comparability of action. The critical question here is whether and how 
developing country actions unsupported by financial aid would be subjected to MRV. It 
should be recalled that the Bali Action Plan links developing countries’ “nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions” to provision of finance, technology and capacity support 
from industrialized countries.  The challenge however is whether and how these actions 
are to be subjected to MRV. 
The view of developing countries regarding this issue was expressed by China and India 
on behalf of the rest of the developing countries to the effect that while actions supported 
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by international finance would be subject to international MRV, unsupported actions 
undertaken as part of a development strategy would only be subject to domestic scrutiny. 
 China further argues that international verification of Chinese emissions target progress 
would be viewed as an infringement upon Chinese sovereignty.240  The US insisted that 
developing countries particularly China also subject their actions to international 
scrutiny. Under the final compromise, non-Annex 1 countries would report upon their 
mitigation actions, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under 
clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected.”241 
Although it would seem that this approach settles the issue, it leaves a lot to be desired as 
regards reconciling differentiation and comparability. In addition, whether the 
compromise will be adopted in domestic politics is still a subject of speculation.242 An 
illustration of the challenge posed to differentiated responsibilities by the failure to 
reconcile differentiation and comparability for example, is that detailed rules will need to 
allow countries like China and India to claim they have retained control over their carbon 
destiny, while also allowing the US to claim it now has the right to hold China and India 
to account, which is inevitably a big hurdle.243  
While the above mandate is based on the principle of CBDR, it is the issue of 
Measurement, Reporting and Verification for Nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
(NAMAs) in developing countries which demonstrates a significant departure from 
CBDR in its pure form.  
The issue of MRV has been dealt with by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWGLCA). AWGLCA is a new FCCC 
subsidiary body established under the Bali Action Plan at Cop13. The new Working 
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Group is responsible for overseeing the process established under the Action Plan to 
develop a framework for addressing climate change post-2012. 
At the eleventh session of AWGLA,244 the Parties agreed that NAMAs, enabled and 
supported by finance, technology and capacity-building, should be subjected to 
Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) at the international level in accordance 
with guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties at its XX session. 
Domestically-funded mitigation actions taken by developing country Parties will be 
subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and verification. For measurement, 
reporting and verification of mitigation actions covered by market-based mechanisms, the 
requirements and rules governing participation in the relevant market-based mechanisms 
shall apply.245 
Another contentious issue at Copenhagen which has implications for CBDR was 
Incremental cost. The complexity of this issue stems from the principle that industrialized 
countries should pay for the “agreed full incremental cost” of developing countries 
measures as enshrined in the UNFCCC.246 
 The issue here is that despite the use of the word “agreed” there is no clarity as regards 
the basis on which incremental costs are to be defined. The result, in practice, has been a 
bargaining process. There is uncertainty surrounding the cost of incremental costs. The 
UK for instance puts the figure at $100 billion per year by 2020 as the cost of support for 
developing country adaptation and mitigation.247 While many developing countries and 
analysts place the required figure much higher.248  Indian and China have consistently 
demanded that industrialized countries contribute 0.5 to 1% of their GDP for climate 
mitigation and adaptation. At Copenhagen India and China stated that they did not 
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anticipate benefiting greatly from these funds, but insisted on them as a matter of 
principle, particularly on behalf of smaller developing countries.249 
The debate revolves around not only the amount of money, but also on questions of 
additionality, predictability and governance. Developing countries have invoked 
differentiated responsibility by inter alia arguing that climate funds should be additional 
to aid, since these are payments by polluters for past emissions.250 But at the same time, 
as industrialised countries argue, if addressing climate change requires rethinking 
development practices, aid patterns over time should also reflect climate considerations. 
Developing countries stress that climate funds should be predictable, and not subject to 
the vagaries of the market.251  
In an attempt to solve this stalemate, “assessed contributions” by all on the basis of a 
basket of criteria has been considered a useful mechanism252. Under the “assessed 
contributions” mechanism proposed by Mexico and Norway, all Parties would contribute, 
but developing countries would be net recipients.253  
However, citing differentiated responsibility; developing countries are strongly opposed 
to contributing funds, even if it is less than they receive. Finally, developing countries 
strongly argue that climate funds should not be construed as aid, but as a response to 
historical responsibility for past emissions, and therefore should be governed in 
substantial part by recipient countries. Of particular contention is that the World Bank, 
controlled by donors, not be allowed to control these funds. Dispute over all these issues 
are closely tied to the principle of differentiation.254 
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3    Challenges of the principle of CDBR in the climate regime  
3.1 +on-participation   
The absence of developing countries on the basis of CBDR has been cited to be, “the most 
serious and intractable shortcoming of the climate regime and particularly the Kyoto 
Protocol.”255 Indeed US’ absence is largely a function of the absence of developing countries.  
The United States is reluctant to join Kyoto because it does not include developing country 
targets. If we can solve the developing country issue, then the issue of US nonparticipation 
will take care of itself.  Three reasons have been advanced for advocating the participation of 
developing countries.256  
 
First, the developing countries will be the source of the big increases in emissions in coming 
years according to the Business-as-Usual path (BAU), that is, the path along which technical 
experts forecast that countries’ emissions would increase in the absence of a climate change 
agreement.257 China, India, and other developing countries will represent up to two-thirds of 
global carbon dioxide emissions over the course of this century, vastly exceeding the 
OECD’s expected contribution of roughly one-quarter of global emissions. Without the 
participation of major developing countries, emissions abatement by industrialized countries 
will not do much to mitigate global climate change.258 
 
Second, if a quantitative international regime is implemented without the developing 
countries, their emissions are likely to rise even faster than the BAU path, due to the problem 
of leakage.259 Leakage of emissions could come about by relocation of carbon-intensive 
industries from countries with emissions commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to non-
participating countries, or by increased consumption of fossil fuels by non-participating 
countries in response to declines in world oil and coal prices. Estimates vary regarding the 
damage in tons of increased emissions from developing countries for every ton abated in an 
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industrialized country. But an authoritative survey concludes “Leakage rates in the range of 5 
to 20 per cent are common”.260 
 
Third, the opportunity for the United States and other industrialized countries to buy 
relatively low-cost emissions abatement from developing countries is crucial to keep the 
economic cost low.261 This necessitates the participation of developing countries in the 
international emissions commitments. Such participation will go a long way in increasing the 
probability of industrialized countries complying with the system of international emissions 
commitments. 
3.2  Challenges of emission targets and per-capita approach 
Under the current climate regime, the principle of CBDR has been translated in practice into 
a set of specific, quantitative emission mitigation obligations for industrialised countries and 
no emission mitigation obligations for developing countries.262 Emission targets and-
timetables inter alia, aim to address the equity concerns of developing countries. However , 
this approach has been criticised on a number of  grounds, first, emission targets represent an 
economic  straitjacket and could impose unacceptable high costs on countries, second from 
the political stand point, rich countries would never accept the huge transfer  of wealth  from 
them to the poor that is implicit in the per capital formulation.263 Third, from a developing 
country perspective, China and India argue that economy-wide, binding emission targets are 
unacceptable because they would unduly restrict their national sovereignty.264 True, emission 
targets give countries flexibility as to the choice of national implementing measures. States 
can implement their targets through a domestic trading scheme, taxes, efficiency standards, 
and so forth.265 But because virtually every aspect of a country’s economy contributes to 
climate change – not only energy production, but also transportation, manufacturing, and 
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even agriculture – an economy-wide target represents, both symbolically and in practice, a 
constraint on a country’s economy as a whole.266 
 
Inevitably, the challenges highlighted above result in compliance problems in the sense that 
states will simply not be able to negotiate a series of progressively stricter emissions 
targets,267  and in the absence of effective sanctioning mechanism, states will be unlikely to 
participate and comply.268  The USA` persistent refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
illustrates the challenges of the emissions targets approach. 
3.3  Challenges associated with comparability of action 
In chapter two, it was indicated that comparability of action poses a challenge to CDBR 
in the following ways: first it requires comparison of mitigation actions between 
industrialized countries and developed countries. This has the effect of altering and or 
eroding differentiation between the North and the South. Second, the requirements of 
Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) under this notion raises  the question of 
whether and how developing countries actions unsupported by financial aid would be 
subjected to MRV.  
Although this issues seems to have been resolved at Copenhagen by requiring, non-
Annex 1 countries to report upon their mitigation actions, with provisions for inter-
national consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that 
national sovereignty is respected, the challenge of reconciling differentiation and 
comparability remains unsolved. Third, is the issue of incremental costs. The challenge 
here stems from the principle that industrialized countries should pay for the “agreed full 
incremental cost” of developing countries measures as enshrined in the UNFCCC.269  The 
problem is that despite the use of the “agreed” there is no clarity as regards the basis on 
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which incremental costs are to be defined.  There is an urgent need to address these issues 
and the AWGLCA should continue to consider these issues in its ongoing sessions. 
 
4   Recommendations  
4.1 Set targets for developing countries 
In chapter three, we established that non-participation of developing countries in 
emission mitigation premised on CBDR is the main challenge of CBDR.  To address  the 
problem of  non-participation, it would be imperative to set indexed growth  targets for 
developing countries  which  will dispel the  fear that  greenhouse gas emission targets  
could adversely impact their  economic growth.270 It is perceived that if developing 
countries are given targets that, while below business-as-usual, are achievable at a lower 
cost than the international carbon price, then the potential gains from emissions trading 
should provide developing countries with an upside incentive to participate.271 
 
 However, the challenge is to set developing country targets at a level that will allow 
them to make more from the sale of surplus emission allowances than it costs to produce 
those surplus allowances by reducing emissions. Moreover, if emission targets are not 
fixed but are tied to a country’s GDP, then this will protect developing countries against 
the downside risk that rapid economic growth will make it costly for them to achieve 
their targets, since as their economies grow, their permitted emissions will rise as well. 
By setting indexed emission targets at an appropriate level, developing countries can be 
enticed to participate.272 And so long as developing countries participate, and the US 
target is set at a relatively moderate level initially, the United States will be willing to 
join as well.273  
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4.2   The need for new formulas for setting targets 
Principles of qualitative emission limits and international trading have been cited as the 
next step after Kyoto.274 This approach will promote comprehensive participation and 
efficiency and will redefine the principle of CBDR.275  It should be recalled that these 
principles are enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol, however, this new approach can be 
distinguished from Kyoto in the sense that it seeks realistically to bring in all countries 
and to look far into the future.276  
 
To achieve comprehensive participation and efficiency, new formulas for setting targets 
have been proposed277.  Formulas include allocation of quotas across countries in any 
given budget period according to a nested sequence of formulas for emissions.278 The 
formula is initially general but becomes specific as the budget period in question draws 
close. From a decade long perspective, the formula for emission limits would be phrased 
as cuts from the expected Business as Usual Path (BAU).279 According to this approach, 
the BAU baseline will involve rapid increases in emissions for such countries as China 
and India. The implication is that ,  notwithstanding cuts relative  to the baseline, there 
will be growth targets  for such countries , not cuts in the absolute  levels of emissions as 
were agreed  by the industrialised countries at Kyoto. 280Thus the formula for targeted 
reductions would inter alia include among its determinants the following variables: 1990 
emissions, emissions in the year of the negotiation, population, income and others 
variables such as whether the country in question has resources like coal or hydroelectric 
power.281 
 
In essence, all countries will be subjected to a uniform formula. Caution should however 
be taken to ensure  that the formula is not too rigid ,for the simple reason that no country 
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be it the US or the developing  countries will agree to a costly sharp reduction  relative  to 
the status quo.282  
 
4.3   Create Incentives for developing countries to join a system of quantitative targets  
One of the reasons why developing countries have sought to rely on the principle of 
CBDR to exempt themselves from commitments is the fear of being asked to undertake 
large emission cuts. To address this fear, the post 2012 climate regime will have to device 
what has been referred to as    the “framework of a nested sequence of formulas”283 
which could include the possibility, that the target for emissions in the limit as the year 
under consideration approaches infinity puts zero weight on income or past levels of 
emissions, and complete weight on population. In the very long run, the developing 
countries would notionally achieve their equity-based demand for equal levels of 
emissions per capita.284 
 
 It is worth considering that by the 22nd century, China could well have caught up with 
Western countries in income per capita (other Asian countries like Singapore have 
already done so), in which case the proposal that the emission targets should put all 
weight on population gives an answer similar to putting all weight on any combination of 
population or income.285 If quantitative emissions commitments are set for developing 
countries in a very careful way, they can address their concerns, at the same time as 
addressing the concerns of the rich countries.286 
 
 Three principles have been proposed287 to guide the formulation of such targets: first, 
gains from trade, this approach envisages a Kyoto-like system of targets-with-trading 
which has both environmental and economic advantages for the world and the developing 
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countries themselves.288 Second is progressivity, one of the reasons why developing 
countries have often invoked the CBDR principle when it comes to emission targets is for 
fear of being asked to accept emissions  targets that are more stringent than BAU. 
Dealing with this impasse requires that a reasonably lower bound for developing country 
emission targets is set which would be the “break even” level. This is the level that leaves 
them neither better off nor worse off economically than if there had been no treaty at 
all.289  It is a level where they have to make some low-cost reductions from the start, but 
where sales of emission permits at an intermediate price are sufficient to compensate 
them for their marginal reduction. The rationale for this approach is to ensure that they 
fall  in the range that is bounded above by BAU and bounded below by the break-even 
level. As long as the target is above the break-even lower bound, the developing countries 
benefit economically from the arrangement.290 They should therefore be enticed by such 
an approach to voluntarily join a system of quantitative targets. 
 
Third,  protection against inadvertent stringency, poor countries worry that uncertainty 
surrounding their forecasted economic performance is so great that they cannot now risk 
adopting an emissions target that would be binding five or ten years in the future.291 A 
response to this concern would be to structure international agreements regarding these 
countries’ targets so as to reduce the risk of being inadvertently stringent.292 
4.4   +eed to differentiate within the developing countries  
As indicated in Chapter two, one of the reasons for America’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol is the lack of commitments for developing countries on the basis of 
differentiated responsibilities. This contention is given credence by the fact that Countries 
with huge populations and fast industrializing economies such as India, China and Brazil 
enjoy equal treatment with other developing countries thereby affording them an unfair 
economic advantage over the developed countries. It is submitted that this contention is 
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legitimate and should be addressed with the urgency it deserves. One of the most feasible 
solutions to this challenge is to differentiate within developing countries. Recent emission 
data shows that China and not the US is now the  world’s largest emitter of carbon 
dioxide.293 Against this background, there is need to redefine differentiation so as to 
allow differentiation within developing countries by apportioning responsibilities and 
commitments to developing countries with high emission levels. 
 
However, in ensuring differentiation within developing countries , we should not lose 
sight of the underlying rationale for differential treatment which is premised on historical 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions whose main responsibility is born by developed 
countries. For instance by way of comparison the United States has been industrialized 
for about a century longer than India and China, therefore its cumulative emissions are 
still higher than that of China, India and Brazil294.  
 
It therefore follows that differentiation within developing countries should aim at 
allocating obligations and commitments to countries like China but should not aim at 
equal treatment of these developing countries with developed countries like US.295  The 
other justification for differential treatment between, developed  and developing countries 
with high emissions such as China and India is what has come to be known as  ‘pollution 
by proxy’296 which means that developed countries have exported their manufacturing 
and emissions to developing countries.297 To illustrate this view a recent study found that 
if all the goods imported into the United States in 2004 had been produced domestically 
America’s carbon dioxide emissions would have been as much as 30 percent higher.298 
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Another study established  that roughly 23% of the greenhouse gas emissions in China is 
generated in the production of goods exported to other countries.299 
 
Therefore in light of the foregoing discussion, differentiation within developing countries 
should not be aimed at requiring developing countries  with high emissions to take up 
similar commitments as the developed countries but it should aim at ensuring equity 
within developing countries by  according differential treatment between developing 
countries with high emissions levels and those with low emission levels. This will ensure 
that the principle of CBDR is maintained albeit not in a slightly modified form.  
 
5     Conclusions  
Notwithstanding CBDR, there is an increasing demand for global participation both by 
major industrialized nations and by key developing countries. Such participation is 
necessary to address the climate change problem effectively and efficiently. The 
justification for global participation in the climate regime is that the share of global 
emissions attributable to developing countries is significantly sky rocketing. It is 
estimated that, developing countries may account for more than half of global emissions 
by the year 2020, if not before.300 A frequently voiced response to this assertion is that, 
on an ethical basis industrialized countries should on their own, take the initial steps of 
making serious emissions reductions. But the simple reality is that developing countries 
provide the greatest opportunities now for relatively low cost emissions reductions.301 
Hence, it would be excessively and unnecessarily costly to focus emissions-reductions 
activities exclusively in the developed world. However, global participation should not 
suppress the principles of equity on which the principle of CBDR is built.  
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It has been proposed that to achieve broad participation, a framework for multilateral 
climate action must be flexible enough to accommodate different types of national 
strategies by allowing for different types of commitments. It must enable each country to 
choose a pathway that best aligns the global interest in climate action with its own 
evolving national interests.302 The flexible approach will involve developed countries 
committing to emissions targets, but allowing them to implement their commitments “in 
conformity with domestic law.303  This approach will allow developed countries, through 
their national legislation, to specify their targets in somewhat different ways. This allows 
developed countries to define their targets differently in their national legislation targets 
differently in their national legislation for example, with respect to precise sectoral 
coverage, base years, or allowable offsets.304 
 
A broader form of flexibility has been proposed by Australia which is enshrined in a 
proposal to establish schedules of national commitments and actions, which is similar to 
the nationally appropriate mitigation action (NAMAs) registry proposal of Korea.305 
Rather than defining commitments through a top-down negotiating process, as in Kyoto, 
states would engage in a bottom-up process, in which they would develop national 
schedules of commitments and actions and then register those commitments and actions 
internationally. As the Australian proposal explains, the schedule approach would “give 
Parties substantial flexibility to craft commitments and actions in a manner appropriate to 
their national circumstances.” Schedules could include both legally binding commitments 
as well as non-binding actions.306 The Australian proposal suggests that developed 
country schedules should include comparable mitigation efforts, including emission 
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targets, while developing country schedules could include other types of commitments or 
actions, such as sectoral targets or particular policies and measures.307 
 
These types of flexibility when fully implemented will address the challenge of lack of 
broad participation in the climate regime which continues to plague the principle of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the Climate Regime. 
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